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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SECTION 522(f): A PROPOSAL FOR THE




Refinancing' is an everyday occurrence that can dramatically af-
fect the treatment of consumer debt in bankruptcy proceedings. Tradi-
tionally, courts have held that refinancing transforms a purchase
money security interest into a nonpurchase money security interest.
2
I. Refinancing arises when a sequence of loans is made by a vendor or lender to a buyer.
When the creditor takes a security interest in the property of the debtor to secure the first loan, a
total repayment amount and a time frame for repayment are fixed. Two broad types of refinanc-
ing arrangements exist. The first type consists of" 'add-on' or future advances contracts which
secure several items under a single, ongoing instrument." In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454, 459 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982). The second type is primarily "consolidation loans, which involve two or more
separate loan instruments." Id In consolidation loans, three events occur: (I) the time for repay-
ment of the initial debt is extended, (2) the balance due on the initial debt is consolidated or
carried forward to be included with a new loan of money; this new loan can vary from the first in
either the total repayment amount, the property encumbered by the creditor's security interest, or
both, and (3) the initial debt is marked "paid by renewal," at which time it is considered refi-
nanced. See, eg., Averhoffv. Peoples Fin. Co. (In re Averhofi), 18 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1982) (nonpurchase money loan, then purchase money loan, with new collateral taken and new
debt issued); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (purchase money loan, then
nonpurchase money loan, with new debt issued and new collateral taken); In re Haus, 33 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) 695 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) (a charge-all or add-on clause in a seller's
contract, which allows the seller to retain a purchase money security interest in merchandise until
total indebtedness corresponding to merchandise is paid in full, allows a series of purchase money
loans with new debt issued and new collateral taken); Credithrift of Amer. v. Littlejohn (In re
Littlejohn), 20 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (original purchase money loan refinanced to
extend time for repayment; no new collateral taken but new debt issued); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) (future advance clause in seller's contract whereby collateral served to
secure any future advance made; new debt issued and new collateral taken). See generally, Mc-
Laughlin, '4dd-On" Clauses in Equioment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much of a Good
Thing, 49 FoRDHAM L. REv. 661 (1981) (thorough analysis of three general circumstances in
which purchase money financing can occur); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 112.2, at 12-8 to -10 (1980) (discussing development
of case law; arguing that under U.C.C. § 9-107(a)(1978) language, a vendor can retain security
interest to secure debt arising out of past or future purchases); Donaldson, An Analyss of Retail
Sales Legislation, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 135, 148 (1947) (discussing add-on clauses as method
of obtaining additional security in installment sales contracts).
2. See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975); In re
1
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The recharacterization of a purchase money security interest3 into a
nonpurchase money security interest4 allows a debtor in bankruptcy to
avoid creditors' claims in certain household goods.'
This approach, however, has recently been rejected by an increas-
ing number of courts which hold that a security interest retains its
purchase money character following refinancing.6 This approach pre-
Coronado, 7 Bankr. 53 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980); Ashworth v. McMahan's Furniture (In re Ash-
worth), 16 Bankr. 645 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); King v. Citizens & S. Natl Bank (In re King), 19
Bankr. 409 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In re Booker, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 285 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1981); W.S. Badock Corp. v. Banks (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977);
Mulcahy v. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. (In re Mulcahy), 3 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1980);
Averhoff v. Peoples Fin. Co. (In re Averhoft), 18 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982); In re
Calloway, 17 Bankr. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
471 (W.D. Mich. 1969); In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966);
In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971); In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980); In re Snyder, 16 Bankr. 380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Lay, 15
Bankr. 841 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Scott, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1038 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1980); Kawasho Internat'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979); In re Haus, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (CALLA-
GHAN) 695 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); Rosen v. Associates Fin. Serv. (In re Rosen), 18 Bankr. 723
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), aI'd on rehearing, 17 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Bechen, 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 324 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981); Kelley v. United Am. Bank of Knoxville
(In re Kelley), 17 Bankr. 770 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); McLemore v. Simpson County Bank (In
re Krulik), 6 Bankr. 443 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); Aalgaard v. Public Fin. (In re Aalgaard), 18
Bankr. 990 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1982); In re Luczak, 16 Bankr. 743 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
3. The requirements for a purchase money security interest are delineated in U.C.C. § 9-107
(1978). See generally B. CLARK, supra note 1, 1 3.9[2], at 3-55 to -57, 2.7[1]-[2], at 2-18 to -21
(discussing purchase money security interests); CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS (L. Nel-
son ed. 198 1) (discussing purchase money security interests); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 29.2, at 779-84 (1965) (discussion of purchase money security interests);
W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 2.05, at 32-34 (1978) (discussing
purchase money security interests).
4. Nonpurchase money security interest is not defined in the U.C.C. or the Bankruptcy
Code. However, since this is the opposite of purchase money security interest, the term appears to
exclude those transactions which secure an obligation that finances the acquisition of the collat-
eral, whether taken by a vendor or lender.
5. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (Supp.
IV 1980) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption
to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such
lien is-
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
6. See Mid-Eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of S. Maryland, 455 F.2d 141 (4th
Cir. 1970); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley), 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga.
1977); In re Rivet, 299 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969); In re Con, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W. D.
Ky. 1982); Credithrift of Am. v. Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn), 20 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1982);.In re Georgia, 22 Bankr. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); General Elec. Corp. v. Scott (In re
Scott), 17 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); Holland v. Associates Fin. (In re Holland), 16
Bankr. 83 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); In re
2
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vents the debtor from avoiding the creditor's purchase money security
interest pursuant to section 522(f)(2)(A) 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and
leaves the creditor with a stake in the debtor's bankrupt estate.8
The original transaction is made when credit is extended by a ven-
dor9 or a loan is made by a lender'" to the debtor to enable the
purchase of household goods. To insure repayment, both vendors and
lenders take purchase money security interests in the goods purchased.
These purchase money loans can be refinanced in three ways:" when
the original collateral secures additional debt or credit,' 2 when addi-
tional collateral 3 is secured,' 4 or when additional debt and collateral,
or credit and collateral, are taken.'5
This Comment examines the characterization of refinanced
purchase money security interests in household goods. First, pertinent
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code)' 6 are examined. Next, a
historical development of the characterization of purchase money se-
curity interests following refinancing is summarized, followed by anal-
ysis of the policies behind section 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code
and section 9-107 of the U.C.C. Finally, this Comment suggests that
the correct view is the more recent one that a purchase money security
interest in household goods retains its purchase money character fol-
lowing refinancing.
James, 7 Bankr. 73 (Bankr. D. Maine 1980); In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 351 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980);
Slay v. Pioneer Credit Co. (In re Slay), 8 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); Union Nat'l Bank
of Pittsburgh v. Northwest Marine, Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 563 (Pa. Ct. of C.P.,
Erie County 1979); Bank of Austin v. Barnett, 549 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Index
Store Fixture Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 284 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
8. Id § 541 provides that the bankruptcy estate is created upon the filing of the debtor's
bankruptcy petition. If a debtor defaults, four identifiable classes compete for the collateral:
(1) unsecured creditors, (2) purchasers, (3) secured creditors, and (4) the debtor's trustee.
9. U.C.C. § 9-107(a)(1978) (applies to sales on credit).
10. Id § 9-107(b) (applies to loan to purchase goods).
11. See McLaughlin, supra note I, at 663.
12. See King v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank (In re King), 19 Bankr. 409, 410 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1982).
13. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) (1978) defines collateral as the property encumbered by the security
interest.
14. See Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh v. Northwest Marine, Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 563, 565 (Pa. Ct. of C.P., Erie County 1979).
15. See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1920)).
[Vol. 18:280
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C., and its provision for purchase
money security interests, 7 two methods of establishing purchase
money security interests existed:18 conditional sales and chattel mort-
gages. A conditional sale 19 was used when a vendor, desiring to insure
payment of an installment sales price, retained title in the goods until
full repayment."0 A chattel mortgage2 was used by a lender who took
a security interest in the goods purchased with the proceeds of the
loan.22 Conditional sales and chattel mortgages were replaced by the
U.C.C. provisions2 3 for purchase money security interests, which are
created by satisfying one of the two-pronged definitional requirements
of section 9-107.24 These two prongs specify different requirements for
17. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978).
18. See generally I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.3, at 68-
73, § 10.2, at 297-301 (1965) (discussing conditional sales theory and pre-U.C.C. security devices);
E. REILEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.2, at 1-8 (1981)
(discussing pre-U.C.C. security devices); 68 AM. JUR. 2d Secured Transactions § 108, at 994 (1973)
(discussing history of purchase money security interests).
19. Conditional sales, in which title is reserved in the vendor until the purchase price has
been paid in full, were desirable at common law because the vendor retained the title without the
necessity of filing a lien. See, e.g., First State Bank v. Harter, 30 Iln. App. 234, 22 N.E.2d 393
(1939). See generally H. BAILEY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 46-47 (1976) (discuss-
ing general characteristics of conditional sale); W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, supra note 3,
§ 2.05, at 32 n.96 (conditional sale contract was pre-U.C.C. security device used by sellers).
20. A general assumption was that "the only obligation which could be secured was the
purchase price of the goods plus expenses connected with, or incidental to, the sale or the financ-
ing transaction." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 18, at 71.
21. See generally W. DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, supra note 3, § 2.05, at 32 n.95 (chattel
mortgage was pre-U.C.C. security device). Two cases illustrating this position are Lonoke Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Bohannon, 379 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1964), and Western United Dairy Co. v. Conti-
nental Mortgage Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 132, 170 N.E.2d 650 (1960).
22. See generally E. REILEY, supra note 18, § 1.2(b), at 1-9 to -10 (discussing chattel
mortgages).
23. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1978) states that Article Nine "applies to security interests created by
contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage ...conditional sale ...intended as
security." Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 9-102 states, "The Article does not. . . abolish existing secur-
ity devices." However, "even though [they are] used, the rules of [Article Nine] govern." These
pre-Code devices are preserved by U.C.C. § 9-105(/) (1978) which broadly defines a security
agreement as "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." Some of the con-
cepts behind conditional sales and chattel mortgages have been retained in the U.C.C.'s purchase
money security interest; for example, U.C.C. § 9-302(2) (1978) permits perfection of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods without filing.
24. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
4
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vendors25 and lenders.26
Under the U.C.C., a purchase money security interest 27 arises in
favor of a vendor or his assignee28 upon a sale of goods on credit. A
vendor's security interest will be characterized as purchase money "to
the extent that it is [1] taken or retained by the seller of the collateral
[2] to secure all or part of the price."29 This language limits the
purchase money character of the vendor's security interest to all or part
of the price of the collateral.
A purchase money security interest also arises when proceeds of a
loan are subsequently used by the borrower to purchase goods. A
lender's purchase money security interest will be a purchase money se-
curity interest "to the extent that it is [1] taken by a person who by
making advances or incurring an obligation gives value [2] to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral [3] if such
value is in fact so used." 30
To preserve the purchase money character of a security interest,
the lender must insure that the loan enables the debtor to acquire rights
in or the use of the collateral. 31 Comment two to section 9-10732 points
out that if a purchase money security interest is claimed by a lender,
the language excludes security interests taken in satisfaction of, or as
security for, a pre-existing claim or an antecedent debt.33 Although the
To create a security interest under Article Nine, the debtor must have rights in the collateral, there
must be a security agreement, and value must be given. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978).
25. Id § 9-107(a).
26. Id § 9-107(b).
27. Id § 9-107.
28. The continuity of a purchase money security interest is assumed after assignment. See,
e.g., In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 726 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (emphasis added).
30. Id § 9-107(b) (emphasis added).
31. In re Manuel, 18 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1981); Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Chiarelli
Bros., 221 Pa. Super. 224, -, 289 A.2d 169, 171-72 (1979) (when lender that financed borrower's
purchase provided new money, as distinguished from a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt, the
lender provided advances within statutory meaning of U.C.C. § 9-107(b)). See generally Gilmore,
The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1370-76 (1963) (discussing the Article Nine
purchase money security interest).
32. U.C.C. § 9-107 comment two (1978) provides:
When a purchase money security interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a
seller, he must of course have given present consideration. . . . [T]he purchase money
party must be one who gives value "by making advances or incurrin; obligation": [this]
language excludes from the purchase money category any security interest taken as se-
curity for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt.
33. See, e.g., In re Culp, 18 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (security interest in refrigera-
tor granted to creditor in return for loan proceeds, which debtor used to pay balance owed to seller
of appliances, was not purchase money security interest because refrigerator was in debtor's pos-
session prior to the loan transaction); In re Dameron, 5 Bankr. 357 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1980) (tak-
5
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U.C.C. does not define "antecedent debt," section 9-107(b) and its com-
ments indicate that a security interest will not be in satisfaction of an
antecedent debt if the loan and purchase of the collateral are closely
related.34 In addition, the collateral must be purchased with the funds
advanced; i.e., there must be an actual sale in which the borrower ac-
quires new goods with the funds.35
To determine if a purchase money security interest retains its
purchase money character after refinancing, one must look to the law
of the state in which the security interest is created.36 Once the security
interest is characterized as either purchase money or nonpurchase
money under state law, federal bankruptcy law determines if the secur-
ity interest can be enforced.37
ing security interest in property previously owned by debtor results in creation of nonpurchase
money security interest).
34. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 29.2, at 782. Professor Gilmore comments:
No doubt the language of paragraph (b) [of § 9-107] assumes the sequence of loan
first and acquisition second or assumes that the loan and acquisition take place simulta-
neously. Suppose, however, that debtor acquires goods on Monday (on unsecured credit
from his seller) and secured party advances the price on Tuesday. Let us assume that
there is no question about the money being "in fact so used"; the question would be
whether a loan made after acquisition could be fairly described as one made "to enable"
the acquisition. Or, to make the case harder, assume that the buyer pays the price (or
writes a check) on Monday and borrows that amount from the second party on Tuesday.
Now there is trouble both on the "to enable" side and on the "in fact so used" side.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that in both the hypothetical cases just put a court could
reasonably find that the secured party had acquired a purchase-money interest. If the
loan transaction appears to be closely allied to the purchase transaction, that should
suffice. The evident intent of paragraph (b) is to free the purchase-money concept from
artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular formalities and sequences should not
be required.
Id (footnote omitted).
35. Id at 783. Professor Gilmore states that U.C.C. § 9-107 is restricted to property acquired
by the debtor with the purchase money loan.
36. See In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (state law applies in bankruptcy
court to allocate priorities among creditors); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
The Conn court found that "the precondition [to a § 522(0(2)(A)] lien avoidance, nonpurchase
money status, derives from state statute. State courts, however, have seldom addressed the issue."
Id. at 456. The Conn opinion stated that the "single state court addressing the issue. . . in a
single paragraph, citing no authority, found that a second financing that did not supply additional
funds to the debtor did not extinguish a purchase money security interest." Id n.4 (citations
omitted); see also In re CuIp, 18 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (character of security interest
in household goods determined by state U.C.C. law); In re Manuel, 18 Bankr. 403, 405 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1981) (court looked to state U.C.C. law to determine if creditor had purchase money or
nonpurchase money security interest in household goods).
37. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603 (1960) (state law deter-
mines priority of creditors' claims, then federal bankruptcy law applies to enable trustee to avoid
certain security interest claims); In re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (under state
U.C.C. law, purchase money security interest retained its purchase money character following
refinancing, then the debtor avoided the security interest by federal bankruptcy law); Booker v.
Commercial Credit Corp. (In re Booker), 9 Bankr. 710 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (under state
6
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III. SECTION 522(f)(2)(A) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Code 8 has two key objectives. As a creditor's
remedy, the act marshalls the debtor's39 assets and provides a mecha-
nism for distribution of the debtor's estate to creditors. As a debtor's
remedy, it provides the debtor with a "fresh start"4 in his economic
affairs by discharging his debts. Historically, bankruptcy law exempted
certain debtor property from attachment by creditors.4" Under section
six of the Bankruptcy Act of 1889,42 exemptions 43 were determined by
state law. Recognizing the unsatisfactory results of this diverse system
of exemptions, which had become disparate and antiquated, Congress
prescribed a uniform set of federal exemptions by enacting section 522
(b) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 The report from the House
Committee on the Judiciary describes the reasons behind these
sections.
Most [state exemption laws] are outmoded, designed for more
rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to serve the needs of
and provide a fresh start for modem urban debtors. The his-
torical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a
debtor from his creditors, to provide him with the basic neces-
sities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all of his non-
exempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a
U.C.C. law, creditor had nonpurchase money security interest which was avoided by application
of federal bankruptcy law).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress has the power to establish uniform
laws "on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." The Supreme Court has held
that, "The subject of 'bankruptcies' includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts
and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
39. The Bankruptcy Code does not use the term "bankrupt" but instead uses the term
"debtor" to mean the person or municipality for whom bankruptcy relief is at issue. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(12) (Supp. IV 1980). The use of "debtor" was felt to carry less of a stigma. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6267.
40. Debtors have historically been given a fresh start.
One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to "relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes" . . . . [The
debtor should be provided a fresh start with] a new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
41. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.01, at 522-7 to -9 (15th ed. 1981) (citations
omitted).
42. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 6, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 598, 92 Stat. 2549.
43. Exemptions are defined as "a right given by law to a debtor to retain a portion of his
personal property free from seizure and sale by his creditors under judicial process." 31 AM. JUR.
2d Exemptions § 1, at 329 (1967) (citations omitted).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)9 (d) (Supp. IV 1980).
7
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public charge. The purpose has not changed, but neither have
the level of exemptions in many States. Thus, the purpose has
largely been defeated. 5
At the same time, Congress recognized that "circumstances do vary in
different parts of the country ' 46 and allowed debtors to elect between
state exemptions or federal exemptions. Under section 522(b),4 7 the
debtor can elect exemptions allowed under the law of the state of his
domicile,48 and non-bankruptcy federal law,49 or he may take advan-
tage of the more liberal uniform federal exemptions;5" the debtor, how-
ever, is not permitted to combine state and federal exemptions. 1
Although federal bankruptcy law is supreme, 52 a state may "opt out" of
the federal exemptions.: 3 If a state opts out, however, the debtor re-
tains certain exemptions. 4
45. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 39, at 126, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6087.
46. Id
47. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
48. Id State bankruptcy laws range from liberal to conservative in their exemptions. See 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.22, at 522-60 (15th ed. 1981); 31 AM. JUR. 2d Exemptions § 37, at
361 (1967).
49. See 1 BANKR. SERV. (L. ED.) 4:99, 4:100 (1979). Some items that may be exempted
under federal non-bankruptcy law are civil service retirement benefits, social security payments,
and veterans' benefits.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate either-
(I) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State
law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically
does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2) (A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of
this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition
at the place in which the debtor's domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day
period than in any other place; and
(B) any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the com-
mencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant to the extent
that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from process under
applicable non-bankruptcy law.
Section 522(d) provides its own set of exemptions for a debtor: home, motor vehicle, personal use
items, jewelry, interest in property, professional books or tools of trade, life insurance contracts,
health aids, certain future earnings benefits, certain rights for compensation for losses. Id.
§ 522(d).
51. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 522.02, at 522-22 (15th ed. 1981) (citations omitted).
52. When Congress exercises the bankruptcy power, it is "unlimited and supreme." Sturges
v. Crowinshield, 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 192 (1819).
53. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980), a state may proscribe the availability of
§ 522(d) (Supp. IV 1980) federal exemptions.
54. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 522.29, at 522-68 to -69 (15th ed. 1981) (citations omitted);
see, e.g., Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part 11- The Interests ofSecured Creditors Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 215, 224-29 (1980) (section 522(f) is an example of
an exemption the debtor retains when a state opts out).
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Section 522(f) allows the debtor to avoid55 certain security interests
which would otherwise impair his exemptions.5 6 The debtor can avoid
security interests to the extent that they impair the exemptions he
would have been entitled to under section 522(b).57  Specifically, sec-
tion 522(f)(2)(A) allows a consumer-debtor to avoid a nonpurchase
money nonpossessory lien on otherwise exempt household goods and
personal items.5" This lien avoidance provision preserves the exemp-
tions provided by section 522(b) against certain creditor interests in
consumer goods.5 9 The legislative history indicates that the purpose of
this section is to protect the unsuspecting consumer-debtor from over-
reaching by creditors.60
55. 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (Supp. IV 1980). The trustee and the debtor share the powers of
avoidance. The debtor must take affirmative action to exercise his power of avoidance rather than
to automatically avoid the lien by operation of law. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 77,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5787, 5863.
56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1), (2), 101(27)-(28) (SUpp. IV 1980). A review of decisions consider-
ing the constitutionality of § 522(0 reveals a great divergence of opinions. Several courts have
found that the lien avoidance provision of § 522(0, as applied to security intbrests which vested
prior to the enactment date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on November 6, 1978, is unconstitu-
tional. See Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981); In re Carroll, 11
Bankr. 45 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Bailey, 10 Bankr. 567 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re
Parker, 10 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In re Sams, 9 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); In re Hammer, 9 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981); In re Schulte, 8 Bankr. 12 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1980); In re Oldham, 7 Bankr. 124 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980). In contrast, other courts have
held that § 522(0 is constitutional as applied to security interests created prior to November 6,
1978. See In re Paden, 10 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Stump, 8 Bankr. 516 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1981); In re Campbell, 8 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Pillow, 8 Bankr. 404
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981); In re Goodrich, 7 Bankr. 590 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Middleton, 7
Bankr. 3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Primm, 6 Bankr. Rep. 142 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
57. See Pickard, supra note 54, at 226-27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) does not
apply to goods which do not otherwise qualify as exempt property under § 522. See also Ken-
nedy, Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 15 IND. L. REv. 477, 491-92 (1982)
(discussing debtor's right under § 522(f) to avoid liens against exempt property for the debtor's
own benefit).
58. Section 522(f)(2)(A) provides that a debtor can avoid a security interest in any household
furnishings, household goods, and appliances held primarily for personal, family, or household
use.
59. See Hearings on HR 31 and HA 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 6127, 6138 (1978) (remarks of David H. Williams, Attorney,
Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Comm'n).
60. Specifically, the legislative history states,
Frequently, creditors lending money to a consumer debtor take a security interest in all
of the debtor's belongings, and obtain a waiver by the debtor of his exemptions. In most
of these cases, the debtor is unaware of the consequences of the form he signs ....
The exemption provision allows the debtor, after bankruptcy has been filed, .. to
undo the consequences of a contract of adhesion, signed in ignorance, by permitting the
invalidation of nonpurchase money security interests in household goods. Such security
interests have too often been used by over-reaching creditors. The bill eliminates any
unfair advantage creditors have.
H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 6088 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
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Section 522(f) comports with the exemption scheme provided in
section 522(b) for a debtor's "fresh start." Only if the creditor shows
that his right to reclaim is based on a purchase money security interest
will he prevail over the debtor's exemption claim.6' Without the ability
to avoid certain encumbrances on exempt property, the debtor would
be denied a fresh start. A Tennessee federal court found that section
522(f)(2)(A) was enacted by Congress to allow consumer debtors to
avoid nonpurchase money security interests taken by creditors in
household goods owned and used by debtors.62 The court emphasized
that section 522(f)(2)(A) was not enacted to avoid security interests in
collateral purchased with advanced money.63 The court also found
that one policy behind avoidance of nonpurchase money security inter-
ests in consumer goods is to release the debtor's property from worth-
less security interests.'
IV. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Judicial Treatment Prior to the Bankruptcy Code
Prior to the Bankruptcy Code,65 the significance of the characteri-
zation of purchase money security interests in consumer goods66 and
farm equipment,67 following refinancing, depended solely on whether
filing was required for perfection.68  The majority of pre-Bankruptcy
Code cases denied purchase money status to refinanced purchase
money security interests and required filing for perfection.
69
61. The creditor has the burden of proof to show that a security interest in household goods is
not voidable. Culp v. Commercial Credit Plan Consumer Discount Co. (In re Culp), 18 Bankr.
621 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982); Lanadaus of Plymouth, Inc. v. Scott (In re Scott), 5 Bankr. 37 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1980).
62. In re Coomer, 8 Bankr. 351, 354 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted on November 6, 1978, but was not effective until
October 6, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2682.
66. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1978) provides for automatic perfection of purchase money security
interests in household goods. Kansas and Oklahoma have not adopted this section.
67. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(c) (1978) provides for automatic perfection purchase money security
interests in farm equipment.
68. One consequence of the purchase money loan being transformed by refinancing was sub-
ordination of the creditor's security interest, unperfected for lack of filing, to the interest of the
bankruptcy trustee. If the loan was not a purchase money loan in consumer goods, it could not
perfect automatically under U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1978). Filing by the creditor was thus required
to maintain purchase money status.
69. See Kawasho Internat'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979); W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Banks (In re Norrell),
1982]
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The pivotal case interpreting U.C.C. section 9-107 and comment
two in relation to the issue of purchase money survival is In re Simp-
son,7" decided shortly after the enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code. In Simpson, the vendor attempted to create a purchase money
security interest,7 by executing a security agreement containing a fu-
ture advance clause.72 Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, the court denied
the lender's 73 claim to priority, finding that the future advance clause
precluded the lender from having a purchase money security interest.
The court noted that when a security agreement contains a future ad-
vance clause, the agreement can remain in effect even after the
purchase price of the original collateral has been fully paid. Finding
no distinction between the prohibition in comment two against a
purchase money security interest taken as security for an antecedent
debt and one taken for a future advance,74 the Simpson court resolved
the issue by stating that "the obligation in a purchase money security
interest must be in the purchase price alone. '75  Although this state-
ment was dictum,76 subsequent courts have followed it.77 A case in
point is In re Manuel,78 in which a vendor made two sales under a
426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990
(5th Cir. 1975); In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971); In re
Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969); In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
70. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 245 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
71. The vendor initially characterized his security interest as purchase money and relied on
U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) to automatically perfect his security interest in farm equipment, but the court
held that the security interest was not a purchase money security interest and therefore the auto-
matic perfection provisions of this section did not apply. The basis for the court's finding that the
security interest was of a nonpurchase money character stems from the fact that the collateral
secured a debt greater than its price. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.
72. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 246. The security agreement stated that the security interest in the
farm equipment secured not only the payment of the purchase price, but also "any future indebt-
edness not to exceed the sum of $1,200,000." Id
73. Before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the seller assigned his purchase money security
interest to a lender. Id. See supra note 28.
74. U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1978) was drafted narrowly. First, the lender must give "value" by
making advances or incurring an obligation. Comment two to U.C.C. § 9-107 states that "this
requirement excludes from the purchase money category 'any security interest taken as security
for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt.'" J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-5, at 1045 (2d ed. 1980).
See generally Note, The Value of "Value" in a Purchase Money Security Interest, 28 BAYLOR L.
REv. 667, 670-85 (1976) (discussing concept of value).
75. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.
76. The Simpson court denied automatic perfection under U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(c), but ulti-
mately held that a purchase money security interest existed because the lender perfected by taking
possession of the secured collateral. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 247.
77. See supra note 2.
78. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
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"charge-all" agreement.79 In the first sale, the vendor took a purchase
money security interest in household furniture; in the second sale, the
vendor took a purchase money security interest in a television set and
household furniture from the previous sale. After the buyer filed for
bankruptcy, the court resolved the priority claims of the creditors by
utilizing the Simpson rationale that a purchase money security interest
is limited to the purchase price of the collateral. s0
Another basis for the court's decision in In re Manuel was the pres-
ence of the charge-all clause. The court focused on the fact that the
security agreement failed to indicate the order in which payments were
to be applied in paying off the purchases. Because the vendor's
purchase money security interest had a likelihood of being greater than
the price of the collateral, the court held that the automatic perfection
provision did not apply and that the vendor lacked a perfected security
interest."1 Other courts have applied this reasoning in the charge-all
context. 2
In situations where it is possible to determine the extent of
purchase money status, several courts have rejected the Simpson ration-
ale. The court in In re Brouse83 held that purchases made after the
effective date of Michigan's Retail Installment Act84 retained their
79. A "charge-all" agreement ensures that title to all goods purchased by the debtor does not
pass to him until all the outstanding indebtedness has been paid to the creditor. "[A charge-all
agreement ensures] that title to nothing passed until title to all passed." Id at 992; cf. Kawasho
Internat'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 203, 204 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
80. The court noted,
A plain reading of the statutory requirements would indicate that they require a security
interest to be in the item purchased, and that. . . purchase money security interest[s]
cannot exceed the price of what is purchased in the transaction wherein the security
interest is created, if the vendor is to be protected ....
507 F.2d at 993. Courts have referred to this as a situation in which the "debt secures more than
its price."
81. Id
82. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (charge-
all agreement was held unconscionable and enforcement denied).
83. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969). The debtor made a series of
purchases ("string purchases"). Among the first items purchased was a stereo and one of the last
items purchased was a cupboard. The court held that since the stereo acted as security not only
for its purchase price, but also for future indebtedness; the seller did not have a purchase money
security interest. However, the cupboard, purchased after the enactment of the Retail Installment
Act, retained its purchase money character because the Act provided a method for allocation of
the debt. Id at 474-76.
84. MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 445.851-.872 (1970). The Act provided,
When subsequent purchases are made, if the seller has retained title or taken a lien or
other security interest in any of the goods purchased under any 1 of the contracts in-
cluded in the consolidation, the entire amount of all payments made prior to such subse-
quent purchases shall be deemed to have been applied to the unpaid time balances of the
12
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purchase money character. The court reasoned that since the pro rata
allocation provisions85 of that Act were part of the security agreement,
the extent to which payments were applied to prior purchase money
security interests could be determined. 86 Applying the same rationale,
the court in In re Staley87 held that purchase money status was not lost
following refinancing. In Staley, after purchasing a stereo, the debtor
bought a freezer under the same security agreement, which provided a
method for apportionment of payments.88 The court reasoned that be-
cause a method was provided to determine when the security interest in
each item of collateral terminated by full payment, the collateral se-
cured its price. 9 The same rationale was applied in In re Mid-A/lan/ic
Flange Co. 90 which concerned a charge-all clause in a commercial con-
text. The court implied that the first-in-first-out method of payment
could be employed to determine the extent of purchase money status.9'
The court also stated "we cannot conclude that the presence of the
'add-on' clause [charge-all clause] alone can prevent the security inter-
est in question from being 'taken or retained by the seller of the collat-
eral to secure all or part of its price.' "92
Courts have disregarded the Simpson rule in other situations. In
Index Store Fixture Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co. , the court advanced a
previous purchases; and each payment after the subsequent purchase made on the con-
solidated contract shall be deemed to have been allocated to all of the various purchases
in the same ratio as the original cash sale prices of the various purchases bear to the total
of all. Where the amount of each installment payment is increased in connection with
subsequent purchases, at the seller's option, the subsequent payments may be deemed to
be allocated as follows: an amount equal to the original periodic payment to the previ-
ous purchase, the balance to the subsequent purchase. However, the amount of any
down payment on the subsequent purchase shall be allocated in its entirety to the subse-
quent purchase. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to cases where such
previous and subsequent purchases involve equipment, parts or other goods attached or
affixed goods previously purchased and not fully paid, or to services in connection there-
with rendered by the seller at the buyer's request.
Id § 445.861(c). The effective date of the Act was Mar. 10, 1967.
85. See 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 475.
86. Contra In re Norrell, 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
87. 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
88. The security agreement provided, "[I]n the case of items purchased on the same date, the
lowest priced item shall be deemed paid for first." Id (emphasis deleted). This method of pay-
ment is known as the first-in-first-out allocation method.
89. Id at 438.
90. 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
91. See. id at 208-09.
92. Id at 208 (citation omitted). The court left open the issue of whether the actual extension
of credit under the charge-all agreement would totally prohibit the characterization of the security
interest as a purchase money security interest or whether this would merely limit the purchase
money character of the security interest to the portion taken to secure the purchase price of the
collateral. Id
93. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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renewal argument. There the vendor, after taking a purchase money
security interest in new collateral, sold additional equipment to the
buyer and executed a new purchase money security interest, which in-
cluded the balance due from the original note. The court found that
the addition of the balance due to the new purchase money agreement
did not realistically change the character of the transaction; therefore,
the subsequent "new" note did not extinguish the prior security inter-
est.94 Similarly, when renewal notes were executed and additional col-
lateral given, or additional credit or cash advances made, the court in
Bank of Austin v. Barnett9 5 held that "the giving of a new note for a
debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the original in-
debtedness unless such is the intention of the parties. 96
B. Judicial Treatment Under the Bankruptcy Code
Under the Bankruptcy Code,97 the importance of purchase money
status has increased because section 522(f)(2)(A) gives the debtor power
to avoid nonpurchase money nonpossessory security interests in house-
hold goods.98 Therefore, if the creditor's purchase money security inter-
est in such goods is transformed into a nonpurchase money security
interest following refinancing, the debtor can avoid the creditor's secur-
ity interest.
Post-Bankruptcy Act cases continued to rely on the Simpson ra-
tionale that a purchase money security agreement is transformed into a
nonpurchase money security agreement after refinancing when the col-
lateral secures a debt other than the purchase price of the collateral. In
one case,99 the vendor executed a purchase money security agreement
with a future advance clause, but upon each refinancing, an additional
sum of money was advanced to the debtor and the prior loan stamped
"paid by renewal."" The court ruled that the presence of the future
94. Id at 291.
95. 549 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); accord State Bank of Young Am. v. Vidmar Iron
Works, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980).
96. 549 S.W.2d at 430 (citing Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379,
198 S.W.2d 79 (1946)).
97. See supra note 65.
98. The debtor has the power to avoid nonpurchase money security interests in household
goods to the extent that such a security interest impairs the § 522(b) exemption.
99. In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980).
100. The initial purchase money security interest was refinanced several times in order to cure
delinquency and bring the account current. Refinancing which cures a delinquency has been
termed "flipped." See In re Ellis, 1 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 798, 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Each refinancing note contained variations from the prior note in amounts financed, payment
amounts, finance rates, and total number of payments.
19821
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advance clause extinguished the purchase money character. The court
quoted the policy argument of Simpson.
One of the purposes of the Code is to "simplify, clarify,
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions."
One of the few exceptions to the requirement that notice by
filing be a prerequisite to perfection of a security agreement is
the purchase money security interest under certain conditions.
If a vendor or lender desires to take advantage of this non-
filing requirement, the burden should be on him to prepare a
simple instrument which shall be a pure purchase money se-
curity agreement without attempting to burden it with com-
plicated and ambiguous impedimenta. Much of the litigation
which filled our courts under pre-code law was due to the ef-
fort of adroit drafters to determine how far they could go in
concocting instruments that would give maximum rights to
vendors and lenders while still qualifying as conditional sales
contracts and thus avoiding the necessity of filing. It is to be
hoped that such antics will not occur under the Code. 01
Almost as an afterthought, the court relied on U.C.C. section 9-107(b)
and comment two to make an alternative argument for the loss of
purchase money status.
It is unnecessary . . . to hold that the future advance
clause destroys the purchase money character of the security
interest since the refinancing alone extinguishes the purchase
money character . . . . [N]either the cash advances nor the
renewal note enabled the Debtor to acquire rights in the col-
lateral. The purpose of the renewal note was to payoff the
original note, an antecedent debt. The purchase money char-
acter of the security interest was extinguished when the pro-
ceeds from the first renewal note were used to satisfy the
original note.
• . . Therefore, the security interest held under the re-
newal note is nonpurchase money. . . and is avoidable under
11 U.S.C. § 522(f).10 2
The antecedent debt argument for transformation of purchase
money security interests following refinancing was extended to lenders
101. 5 Bankr. at 657 (citing In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 248 (citations omitted)).
102. Id. Contra Meadows v. Household Retail Serv. (In re Meadows), 9 Bankr. 880, 881
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in In re Mulcahy.113 The court noted that there was no justification for
applying a different rule to lenders as opposed to sellers as either situa-
tion creates the same problem, an "inability to determine when any one
item is paid off and freed of the security agreement."' 1 4
In re Coomer,10 5 however, rejected the Simpson rationale on two
bases." 6 First, U.C.C. section 9-107 does not require transformation of
a purchase money security interest upon refinancing. The court inter-
preted the "to the extent that" language of section 9-107 as creating a
security interest which is characterized as purchase money to the extent
that the security interest meets the requirements of section 9-107.107
The court found that section 9-107 allows a security interest to have
two parts: a purchase money part to the extent that it is secured by
collateral and a nonpurchase money part.10 8
Second, the court looked to the practical effects of transformation
following refinancing.1 9 If purchase money status in household goods
was lost following refinancing, the debtor would keep exempt property
103. Mulcahy v. Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. (In re Mulcahy), 3 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1980).
104. Id. at 457. The court noted that U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978) comment 2 may be more properly
applicable to a lender than to a seller. Id. (citing Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-
Atlantic Flange Co.), 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 203 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
105. Coomer v. Barclay's Am. Fin. (In re Coomer), 8 Bankr. Rep. 351 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1980).
106. Cf. In re Slay, 8 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980), a companion case to Coomer,
holding that when a purchase money and nonpurchase money loan were consolidated and no
subsequent payments made, then regardless of whether contractual or statutory apportionment
methods were present, a purchase money security interest existed. Since no payments were made
after the consolidation, the court could determine the extent of purchase money and nonpurchase
money debt. Id. at 358. Contra Rosen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. (In re Rosen), 18 Bankr. 723
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1981), a'd on rehearing, 17 Bankr. 436, 438 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982) ("Regardless of
whether the purchase money and nonpurchase money facets of the second loan can be disentan-
gled, 'the refinancing alone extinguishes the purchase money character of the security interest.' ")
(citing In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980)).
107. 8 Bankr. at 354. The court reviewed the purpose of § 522(f)(2).
The Commission took the view that non-purchase-money security interests in
household goods generally have no value to the creditor, except as a means of coercing
payment by threatening repossession. The Commission concluded that debtors should
not be denied the benefit of their exemptions in household goods because of valueless
security interests. That idea led to § 522() ....
The main reason [for § 522(f)(2) was that] household goods securing nonpurchase
money debts generally have no substantial market value. That conclusion is most appro-
priate when the debtor... [put up as collateral] used household goods. The conclusion
is less appropriate for new or used goods bought... with the proceeds of a purchase
money loan.
[.. IT]he purpose of§ 522(f)(2)(A) generally is to avoid security interests that debt-
ors grant in their already owned, used household goods.
Id (citations omitted; emphasis added).
108. Id at 353-54.
109. Id at 354.
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free of the creditor's claim. In contrast, if the court enforced the
purchase money security interest, the debt would consist of two parts,
purchase money and nonpurchase money. A method was needed, ab-
sent statutory or contractual provisions, for apportioning the security
interest between these two parts and for applying the payments to each
part. The court expressed its reluctance to follow prior case law based
on U.C.C. section 9-107, as prior decisions may not always properly
reflect the policy behind section 522(f)(2)(A)." 0 However, it concluded
that prior decisions must be followed unless some method existed for
determining the extent to which each item of collateral secured its own
purchase price.'I' The court refused to judicially determine the extent
of purchase money status," 2 stating, "[T]he administration of bank-
ruptcy cases demands a workable and clear rule. Without some guide-
lines, legislative or contractual, the court should not be required to
distill from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest
is purchase money."'3
Numerous courts have advanced a renewal-novation argument."14
Renewal includes,
the idea that an obligation is renewed when the same obliga-
tion is carried forward by the new paper. . . .There may be
a change of parties. There may be an increase of security, but
there is no renewal unless the obligation is the same. What
makes the renewal is an extension of time in which to dis-
charge the obligation. If the obligation changes, there can be
no renewal, because there can be no such thing as the re-
establishment of an old obligation by the creation of a new
obligation different in character."'
110. Id at 355.
111. Id at 353.
112. Cf. Inre Booker, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 285 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981). Basing
its refusal to make a judicial determination of the extent of purchase money status on policy
grounds, the court held that recognition of U.C.C. § 9-107 "to the extent that" language would
unduly complicate the application of the relevant code provisions. The allocation of the debt
between purchase money and nonpurchase money status would be violative of one of the stated
purposes of the code, "to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions." Id at 290-91.
113. 8 Bankr. at 355.
114. For a renewal argument, see Credithrift of Amer. v. Littlejohn (In re Littlejohn), 20
Bankr. 695 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). Contra King v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank (In re King), 19
Bankr. 409 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982). For a novation argument, see Aalgaard v. Public Fin. Co. (In
re Aalgaard), 18 Bankr. 990 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1982); Averhoff v. Peoples Fin. Co. (In re
Averhoff), 18 Bankr. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981); Snyder v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Sny-
der), 16 Bankr. 380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
115. King v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank (In re King), 19 Bankr. 409,412 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982)
(quoting Lowry Natl Bank v. Fickett, 122 Ga. 489, 492, 50 S.E. 396, 398 (1905)).
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Some courts have held a renewal occurs upon refinancing." 6 The
court held in In re A1-Brite Sign Service Co. 117 that when a note was
paid by renewal, the new note did not constitute payment of the prior
note agreeing that "it is a narrow and mistaken view to regard the
[chattel] mortgage as a transaction independent of the prior mortgage
... ."I" Other courts have held that "the giving of a new note for a
debt evidenced by a former note does not extinguish the original in-
debtedness unless such is the intention of the parties."'' 9
In contrast to renewal, novation is the "substitution of a new obli-
gation for an old one, with the intent to extinguish the old one, or. . . a
new debtor. . . with the intent to release [the old one], or a new credi-
tor, with the intent to transfer the rights of the old one to him."' 20
Some courts have held that a novation occurs upon refinancing of a
purchase money security interest.' 2' For example, inln re Calloway,122
the court held that each consolidation was not only characterized as
satisfaction of an antecedent debt, but could also be characterized as
"an entirely new loan."' The court reinforced this novation argument
by stating that even though each prior loan was stamped "made again,"
no reference was made to the original financing statement. 24 Novation
of a purchase money security interest has been held to occur upon refi-
nancing when by state statute 25 a new obligation is deemed to arise. 126
116. See, eg., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Southwest Pa. Nat'l Resources (In re Southwest
Pa. Nat'l Resources), 11 Bankr. 901 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). The court stated,
Even where the parties originally contemplate a single debt, secured by a single item...
or ... group of items, the secured party and the debtor may enter into further transac-
tions whereby the debtor obtains additional credit and the secured party is granted more
security. The validity of such agreements as against creditors, trustees in bankruptcy and
other secured parties has been widely recognized ....
Id at 903 (quoting James Falcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
11, 25 (Minn. 1972)).
117. 11 Bankr. 409, 410 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
118. Schreiber v. Colt, 80 F.2d 511, 511 (10th Cir. 1935); accordIn re All-Brite Sign Serv. Co.,
II Bankr. 409 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
119. Bank of Austin v. Barnett, 549 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (citing Schwab v.
Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 145 Tex. 379, 198 S.W.2d 79 (1946)).
120. Truscon Steel Co. v. Thirlwell Elec. Co., 96 S.W.2d 1023, 1025 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936).
121. See infra notes 125 & 129.
122. 17 Bankr. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
123. Id at 215.
124. Id
125. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 31.08.170(4) (1974) which provides,
Upon payment of the loan in full, mark indelibly every obligation signed by the
borrower with the word "paid" or "cancelled" and release any mortgage and restore all
notes and collateral which no longer secures a loan and to which the borrower may be
lawfully entitled: Provided, however, That in case any such document or obligation is in
custodia legis these requirements shall not be applicable ....
See Aalgaard v. Public Fin. Co. (In re Aalgaard), 18 Bankr. 990 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1982).
126. SeeAalgaard, 18 Bankr. 990; Averhoffv. Peoples Fin. Co. (In re Averhoff), 18 Bankr. 198
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982).
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In re Conn,127 decided in 1982, rejected the Simpson rationale and
prior purchase money transformation theories. In Conn, the vendor 28
executed a purchase money security interest to secure the purchase
price of the collateral. When the purchase money obligation was refi-
nanced, the lender issued new debt 2 9 and took new collateral. 30 Upon
the debtor's bankruptcy,' the court followed a two tier analysis to
hold that purchase money character was not changed by refinancing.132
The first level of analysis focused on a fundamental error in the
reasoning of In re Simpson. 33 The court pointed to the fact that Simp-
son did not recognize the explicit statutory language of the purchase
money requirement, "to the extent that."' 34 Relying on the interpreta-
tion given to this language by the court in In re Coomer,131 the Conn
court held that security interests may consist of two parts, purchase
money and nonpurchase money. It also held that the U.C.C. does not
require purchase money status to be lost in its entirety if the collateral
secures both its price and an antecedent debt or future advance. 136
Comment two to section 9-107 merely prohibits purchase money status
to be found "to the extent that" an item secures antecedent debt. The
court reasoned the substance of the transaction, not the form, should be
the basis of the decision.
Though in form the original note is cancelled, its balance
is absorbed into the refinancing loan. To the extent of that
balance, the purchase money security interest taken under the
original note likewise survives, because what is owed on the
original note is not eliminated, it is merely transferred to, and
increased in amount by, another obligation. The refinancing
changes the character of neither the balance due under the
first loan nor the security interest taken under it.137
The second level of analysis focused on the method of apportion-
127. 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
128. The vendor subsequently assigned the indebtedness to a lender. Id at 455. See supra
note 28.
129. The lender issued approximately $700 in new debt. 16 Bankr. at 455.
130. Id The lender took additional security in household goods.
131. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, a balance of $138.39 was owed on the household
goods. Id at 459.
132. Id
133. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
134. 16 Bankr. at 457.
135. 8 Bankr. 351; see supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
136. 16 Bankr. at 457.
137. Id. at 459.
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ment used to separate the purchase money and nonpurchase money
parts of the debt.' The court rejected prior holdings, stating that
purchase money status should not hinge on the presence of a statutory
or contractual method of apportionment; rather the court should give
effect to the rule that a security interest is purchase money to the extent
that property secures its price, and apportion the debt by the first-in-
first-out method.139  The court reasoned that even with legislative or
contractual guidelines to assist in apportioning the debt, the determina-
tion of the extent of purchase money security interest would be com-
plex. The difficulty of dividing a security interest into purchase money
and nonpurchase money parts does not prohibit a court from allowing
both parts to exist.
V. DISCUSSION
Although the controversy over the character of purchase money
security interests following refinancing began before the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code, the effect of such characterization under section
522(f)(2)(A) magnifies its importance." °
The transformation of a purchase money security interest into a
nonpurchase money security interest upon refinancing can have three
138. Id at 458-59.
139. Id For an example of a statutory method of apportionment, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A,
§ 2-409 (1981) (Consumer Credit Code provides for first-in-first-out method of allocation of con-
sumer related debts). Section 2-409 provides,
(I) If debts arising from two or more consumer credit sales, other than sales pri-
marily for an agricultural purpose or pursuant to a revolving charge account, are secured
by cross-collateral (Section 2-408) or consolidated into one debt payable on a single
schedule of payments, and the debt is secured by security interests taken with respect to
one or more of the sales, payments received by the seller after the taking of the cross-
collateral or the consolidation are deemed, for "the purpose of determining the amount of
the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been first applied to the pay-
ment of the debts arising from the sales first made. To the extent debts are paid accord-
ing to this section, security interests in items of property terminate as the debts originally
incurred with respect to each item is [sic] paid.
(2) Payments received by the seller upon a revolving charge account are deemed,
for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by the various security
interests, to have been applied first to the payment of credit service charges in the order
of their entry to the account and then to the payment of debts in the order in which the
entries to the account showing the debts were made.
(3) If the debts consolidated arose from two or more sales made on the same day,
payments received by the seller are deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount
of the debt secured by the various security interests, to have been applied first to the
payment of the smallest debt.
Id;see also In re Staley, 426 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (contractual apportionment of debt by
first-in-first-out method).
140. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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consequences. First, the creditor loses purchase money status;14 1 sec-
ond, the creditor loses in a priority dispute with other perfected credi-
tors; 142 and third, the creditor loses to the trustee in bankruptcy. 43
Prior to the Bankruptcy Code, the transformation of a purchase
money security interest resulted in the creditor losing the right to auto-
matic perfection. Thus the creditor's stake in the debtor's estate be-
came subject to the priority rules of the U.C.C.' 4 The transformation
of a purchase money security interest may now result in the creditor's
purchase money security interest being totally voided, 145 divorcing the
creditor from the general priority rules of U.C.C. 146
The cumulative effect of loss of purchase money status following
refinancing is to jumble the priorities among creditors and to defeat the
following reasons for a priority system:
(1) [to assure] [c]ommercial certainty...
(2) [to assure that] [c]reditors. . . know with precision what
their rights are relative to the collateral...
(3) [to protect] the reliance interest. . . [of creditors]
(4) [to] encourage the flow of commerce...
(5) to protect [the purchase money lenders] whose credit en-
ables the debtor to acquire . . . assets...
(6) [to promote] a policy of fairness ....
The courts have not articulated whether they will recognize the "to
the extent that" language in section 9-107, and the interpretation given
this section has produced conflicting results. Some courts have ignored
the express "to the extent that" language. 148 Other courts have given
effect to the express language and have acknowledged that a purchase
money security interest may have two parts, which may be apportioned
into purchase money and nonpurchase money by either contractual,
statutory, or judicial methods.' 49
Before the enactment of the U.C.C., collateral from a conditional
sale could not secure a debt owed to a vendor that was unrelated to the
141. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1978).
142. Id § 9-312(5).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. IV 1980).
144. Article Nine priority rules are found primarily in U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -301, -306 to -316
(1978). See Special Project: The Priority Rules of Art. 9, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834 (1977).
145. A creditor's nonpurchase money security interest in household goods can be avoided by a
debtor pursuant to § 522(Q(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980) of the Bankruptcy Code.
146. See supra note 144.
147. B. CLARK, supra note 1, 1 3.1[2](a), (c), (d), (e), (O, at 3-4 to -6 (1980).
148. See In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
149. See.n re Conn, 16 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
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purchase price of the collateral.15 0 In contrast, collateral from a chattel
mortgage could secure debt that was owed to the lender even though it
was unrelated to the mortgaged sale.15 ' Section 9-107 of the U.C.C.
combined these two concepts in subsections (a) and (b), creating a new
concept for securing the debt. 151 It can be argued that by combining
these two concepts and their historical allowances and prohibitions into
one conceptual mechanism, the drafters wanted to strictly define the
circumstances in which a vendor or a lender could use collateral ac-
quired through borrowed money to secure a debt that was unrelated to
the purchase price. It can be further argued that the "to the extent
that" language of section 9-107 was inserted not to void purchase
money status when collateral secures a debt that is unrelated to and
greater than the collateral's purchase price, but merely to limit availa-
bility of purchase money status.
Courts have not viewed the history of purchase money security
interests as decisive in the determination of whether purchase money
status should survive refinancing. Since both the arguments for and
against transformation of a purchase money security interest following
refinancing have merit, the purposes of the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy
Code must be reviewed to see which characterization is most desirable.
The congressional intent in enacting section 522(f)(2)(A) was to
give the debtor a fresh start by permitting avoidance of nonpurchase
money obligations which held used household goods as their collat-
eral.' 53 Therefore, section 522(f)(2)(A) is improperly used when
purchase money security interests on newly acquired household goods
are transformed into nonpurchase money security interests and avoided
under the section.
Section 1-102(1) of the U.C.C. states that the provisions of the
Code should be liberally construed. The underlying purposes include,
"(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices through custom, usage and agreement of parties; (c) to make
uniform the law among various jurisdictions."' 54 In re Simpson' ar-
gued that a purchase money security interest should be transformed
150. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 40-45 & 60 and accompanying text.
154. U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1978).
155. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CaUaghan) 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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into a nonpurchase money security interest following refinancing to
promote the simplicity required in commercial transactions under
U.C.C. section 1-102(2)(a).156 The court reasoned that transformation
freed the security agreement from "complicated and ambiguous imped-
imenta."' 157 However, section 102(2)(b) of the U.C.C. offers a compet-
ing policy favoring retention of purchase money status following
refinancing, "to permit the continued expansion of commerce."' 158
Commerce is benefited in two ways. First, from the borrower's point of
view, purchase money status makes expansion easier, because the cred-
itor will be more likely to advance funds to help purchase an asset if
the creditor can have the debt secured by the acquired property. If
purchase money status is lost upon refinancing, creditors will have to
make each purchase money security interest a separate transaction
which results in additional costs for both debtor and lender.15 9 From
the creditor's point of view, purchase money survival encourages sales
by giving the creditor purchase money priority over other pre-existing
creditors. If the creditor's purchase money status is transformed, the
sale "will be discouraged rather than encouraged, and the Code policy
of purchase money priority will be undermined."' 6 The transforma-
tion of purchase money security interests discourages loans and the use
of those loans to acquire new assets.' 6'
Second, section 1-102(2)(a) and (c) of the U.C.C. offers the follow-
ing policies that support retention of purchase money status following
refinancing: "[To simplify [and] clarify. . . the law governing com-
mercial transactions. . . [and] to make uniform the law among various
jurisdictions."' 62 If purchase money status is permitted to survive refi-
nancing, the courts will acknowledge the "to the extent that" language
of section 9-107. This will achieve the above mentioned goals to sim-
plify, clarify, and unify the law. If court decisions follow one interpre-
tation of the language, creditors and debtors will have the ability in
advance to better determine their respective rights under the refinanc-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 248.
158. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1978).
159. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 670. Perfection by filing for purchase money security inter-
ests in consumer goods has three adverse effects: (1) clutters filing system; (2) inconveniences
those involved in filing system; (3) results in expenses disproportionate to the amount of credit
given. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 74, § 23-7, at 920 (automatic perfection
of consumer goods spares the filing system considerable burden).
160. McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 671.
161. De Koven, Secured Transactions, 37 Bus. LAw. 1011, 1030-31 (1982).
162. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (c) (1978).
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ing agreement. This should lead to more settlements by negotiation.
Another advantage of a clear and uniform law is the prevention of fo-
rum shopping by a party in an effort to find a court which will support
its position. In addition, this solution comports with general business
practice and understanding. 163
Addressing the problems created by conflicting decisions, one
court stated, "[A]bsent specific congressional legislation to the contrary,
the rules applicable to priorities in commercial law must be consistent
whether in the context of bankruptcy or everyday commercial transac-
tions . . . . [T]he Bankruptcy Code is designed to interact with the
Uniform Commercial Code. . ,."I' Allowing purchase money status
to be transformed following refinancing potentially allows two different
systems of priorities, one in bankruptcy proceedings and the other in
nonbankruptcy proceedings. Although it can be argued that a legisla-
tiv& remedy is needed,165 until the differences in basic assumptions of
the Bankruptcy Code and U.C.C. are legislatively resolved, 166 a uni-
form rule is needed to decide this issue to produce the desired outcomes
and support the underlying policies. Presently, various courts adopt
the divergent views of either In re Simpson, which precludes any
purchase money security interest when refinancing occurs, or the view
advanced by In re Conn. By holding that a security interest can be
divided into two parts and that purchase money status following refi-
nancing is not dependent on the presence of some method of allocation,
163. See McLaughlin, supra note 1, at 669.
164. In re Gibson, 16 Bankr. 257, 267 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
166. Some argue that the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C. creates an
inherent conflict due to the difference in basic assumptions on which each is grounded.
It can be argued that the Bankruptcy Code is grounded in pre-twentieth century
economic conditions. Credit used to be based principally on assets. To obtain credit a
debtor had to pledge assets; if the debtor didn't pay, he lost his assets. Traditional con-
sumer bankruptcy relief is predicated on that experience. Today, however, all consumer
credit is extended upon a consumer's ability to repay out of future income, not through
liquidation of assets. Yet, while the creditor looks to income, the Bankruptcy Code looks
only to assets. Not surprisingly, virtually no assets are available for distribution to credi-
tors in consumer cases; property exemptions and security interests in the consumer's
most valuable assets. . . come first.
In short, it is possible to conclude that the code approach contradicts the basic as-
sumption on which credit was extended-the consumer's future income ....
Evans & Johnson, Proposalsfor Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 37 Bus. LAW. 1117, 1124-25. Ad-
ditionally, S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 815712-15 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981) has
been introduced into Congress and would make substantive changes in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
The bill would amend the Bankruptcy Reform Act to make "bankruptcy relief consistent with
transactional assumptions underlying the grant of consumer credit." 72 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
35. Section 522(i) would be repealed by S. 2000.
19821
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Conn allows the creditor to retain purchase money status on newly ac-
quired household goods used as collateral for the indebtedness. This
analysis confirms that Conn is the better view because it allows a
purchase money security interest to survive refinancing to the extent of
the actual value of the collateral, which promotes the policies of both
the U.C.C. and Bankruptcy Code.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has traced the history of purchase money transfor-
mation following refinancing from In re Simpson to In re Conn. It has
argued that the more recent decision, Conn, is based upon a more rea-
sonable interpretation of the statutory rules. Transformation of non-
purchase money security interests upon refinancing, which is inherent
in the Simpson rationale, does not fairly balance the interests of the
parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings. Good faith creditors lend
purchase money in reliance that their security interests will have
purchase money priority; this should not be avoided by refinancing. If
courts continue to follow the Simpson rationale and deny creditors
purchase money status, debtors will find refinancing difficult to obtain.
The interests of both creditors and debtors will be advanced if the lead
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